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Teaching Character; Cultivating Virtue Perception and Virtue 
Reasoning Through the Curriculum 
 
Given the increased interest in character education across the world, educators are seeking 
guidance for their practice.  This paper seeks to add to the evidence base about if and how 
character can be taught by discussing the results of a pilot evaluation (n 527) of a curriculum 
intervention designed to enhance two components of character: virtue perception and virtue 
reasoning.  After the intervention the participants had improved virtue perception and 
reasoning scores compared to the control group.  Further, female students scored higher in 
the pilot than their male counterparts. The results demonstrate how educating these 
components of character might be possible, providing evidence for a debate that goes back to 
Aristotle and today is keenly debated in academic, policy and practice circles.  The findings 
are significant as they provide evidence as to how character might be taught through and 
within the programmes of study of existing curriculum subjects.   




Character Education Policy and Practice  
The roots of character education arguably go back to the Greek philosophical tradition and 
are most notable in the writings of Plato and Aristotle.  Recently, character education has 
witnessed a revival and intentional efforts to cultivate character qualities and traits in children 
and young people have become increasingly prominent in policy discussions in Britain and 
across the globe (Kristjánsson, 2015). Policy makers in the UK, from all political parties, 
have given major presentations on character education and most recently the former Secretary 
of State for Education, the Rt. Hon Nicky Morgan MP, has authored a book on character 
education entitled Taught not Caught (2017). The renewed or perhaps more explicit focus on 
character is seemingly broad enough to encompass theorists of different political persuasions 
(Ecclestone 2012) and ‘can no longer simply be written off as a project of the conservative 
right or the religious lobby, and has attracted supporters from across the political spectrum’ 
(Suissa,2015 : 106/7). Kristjánsson (2013: 278) has sought to debunk the myth that character 
education is ‘conservative’ and ‘supportive of the status quo’. He cites Martha Nussbaum 
(1990) to argue that Aristotelian virtue-and-well-being theory, if transposed to the modern 
world, would have radically reformative and progressive implications. Perhaps the most 
pressing point here is that some form of emphasis of character education, from Aristotle to 
the social reformer Robert Owen to more recent focus, has been present in discussions of 
varied provenance about the purpose of education.  
Character education has also attracted academic, as well as political, attention in recent years. 
As character education has been generally conceived as a multi-faceted concept that 
embodies a range of explicit and implicit activities, previous studies have warranted 
contributions from across a range of disciplines, including: philosophy (see for example Carr, 
2008); psychology (see for example Peterson and Seligman, 2004); and education (see for 
example Author et al, 2016). This work demonstrates the breadth of character education and 
the range of lenses through which it can be viewed. Despite this political and academic 
interest, a common point of departure is about the actual practice of character education, 
leading onto two important questions: can character be taught, and if so how should it be 
taught?  
Aristotle was concerned that ‘we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in 
order to become good’ (Aristotle, 2009: 24). The implication is that attempts at virtue 
development would be futile if they did not issue in some explicit changes in conduct, in 
individuals actually behaving virtuously. A pertinent question then is how the possible gap 
between knowing the good and doing the good might be bridged and what would deliberate 
educational efforts that encourage young people to both know and do the right thing consist? 
This complex question has troubled educationalists, philosophers, psychologists and well as 
those writing from other disciplinary perspectives for many years.  A clearer picture is being 
built up over time as new evidence emerges; the research reported on in this present paper has 
the modest ambition of providing a few more pieces to the complex jigsaw. The pieces are 
evidence about how virtue perception and virtue reasoning, two components of virtue 
(Jubilee Centre, 2017) might be taught.  Virtue Ethics and Character Education 
In order for character education to be successful, firm philosophical foundations are required 
from which to develop approaches to educating character and virtue.  Questions about what is 
morality and what it means to be a moral person have persisted throughout history; most 
notably in the deontological traditions as characterised by the work of Kant and utilitarian 
traditions as characterised by the work of Bentham and J.S. Mill. There is not space within 
this paper to unpack the well-established arguments between these traditions in any depth, 
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and the paper focuses primarily on the most visible recent movement in the character 
education field; namely, the convincing case being made by moral and educational 
philosophers (see, for example, Kristjánsson) as to the advantages of virtue ethics as a moral 
theory on which character education interventions can build. Although Aristotelian 
conceptions of character education are not without their challenges, it is arguably well suited 
to provide a theory of change that makes a direct link from the education of virtues to human 
flourishing, and crucially emphasises the importance of human agency and critical reasoning 
in appropriate moral thoughts and actions. At its heart, virtue ethics emphasises flourishing as 
the widely accepted goal of human life and that character education should be a deliberate 
attempt to inculcate the virtues necessary for, not only individuals, but also for societies to 
thrive.  For the purposes of this paper, character education should therefore be understood as 
any form of moral education focusing on the development of virtues as stable traits of 
character with the aim of promoting human flourishing (Eudaimonia) and founded on the 
general theory of virtue ethics (Kristjánsson, 2015). Virtues, such as compassion, honesty and 
courage, might be considered the building blocks of character as they are concerned with 
morally praiseworthy conduct (Author et al, 2017). The principles of Aristotelian character 
education present both an opportunity and a challenge for those concerned with character 
education. They invite innovation and creativity to develop new approaches as well as a 
challenge to understand how these new approaches can be applied in current educational 
systems where priorities often lie elsewhere.  
An emerging practice-based model for character education 
Educational models, built on sound theory, are important in education. They can also be 
popular, for example the ‘moral development model’ (Kohlberg, 1981) although heavily 
critiqued, is still used by some today. Theoretical models help educators understand 
seemingly complex conceptual frameworks in accessible formats. However, few in the field 
of character education are without challenge. This is because character is an inherently 
complex construct. Curzer (2016) argues that moral development should not be viewed as 
straight forward and moral progress cannot be understood as movement from one stage to the 
next.  For Curzer  
People’s moral abilities develop at different rates with respect to different spheres of 
human life. Each person is not virtuous, continent, incontinent or vicious overall, but 
rather he or she is virtuous with respect to some spheres of life, continent with respect 
to other spheres, and incontinent and/or vicious with respect to yet other spheres. 
(Curzer, 2016: 121).  
Curzer reminds us that overly simplistic models are likely to be flawed due to the 
unquantifiable number of components or what he calls ‘centi-virtues’ that are associated with 
growing in virtue (Curzer, 2016). To put these ideas into context, we need to be mindful of 
where the Kohlbergian stage-theory project failed. It was undone partly by its methodology, 
which equated an individual’s moral maturity with the ability to offer solutions to far-fetched 
dilemmas, and partly by its ambition of supposing that students would act morally as a simple 
consequence of knowing how to act morally, or even of just knowing how to articulate 
convincing moral judgements. In 1980 Augusto Blasi published a much-cited meta-analysis 
of empirical studies that gauged the relation between moral reasoning and moral behaviour. 
What Blasi found was that moral judgement plays at best a modest role in motivating moral 
action (Blasi, 1980). Thus, a ‘moral gap’ had been identified between cognition and action 
that theorists – including Blasi himself – have been trying to bridge ever since.  
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An alternative approach to character education model, that might be deemed consistent with 
Curzer(2016), is seeking to define the components or constructs of virtue growth. These are 
likely to be many and complicated, but some broad pillars that these features can be grouped 
around might be sought. The attraction of such an approach is that it does not set out to fully 
map a developmental path for moral growth, but instead details some important places to visit 
on the way. For example, the popular ‘Four Component Model’ addresses areas that predicate 
moral behaviour and provides a conceptualisation of successful moral functioning and the 
capacities it requires (Rest et al., 1999). At the heart of the model are four inter-related 
abilities that it is believed are required to be a moral individual – these are moral sensitivity, 
moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral character.   
Drawing inspiration from this work, academics and practitioners at the Jubilee Centre for 
Character and Virtues have been developing a similar model and one that draws heavily on a 
virtue ethical understandings of character. Attempts at building a model is founded on a 
belief that if character education is to flourish, it must have some guiding, structural 
constructs and concepts that give coherence to the overall curriculum that a student 
experiences (Narvaez and Lapsley, 2008). A key challenge is to build a model that is 
accessible to teachers, but not so simplistic it undermines the considerable and widely 
acknowledged complexities of character. The features of the emerging model are clustered 
around seven inter-related components: virtue perception, virtue knowledge and 
understanding, virtue emotion, virtue identity, virtue motivation, virtue reasoning, and virtue 
practice (Jubilee Centre, 2017: 8). Presently, although there is a great deal of research going 
on, the seven components that make up these pillars as well as the relationship (or the bridge) 
between these pillars is under-explored. The aspiration of the current work is to add evidence 
as to how two of the components, virtue perception and virtue reasoning, might be taught. It 
is not possible, within the limits of the present research, to show how these components 
might contribute to the broader aim of bridging the infamous Blasi gap.   
 
Conceptions of virtue reasoning can be linked to the construct of moral reasoning as 
understood by neo-Kohlbergians (see Rest et al., 1999). Like moral reasoning, virtue 
reasoning builds on the idea of rational judgments but places the emphasis firmly on 
character virtues and in particular the broader concept of phronesis; the meta-virtue that is at 
the heart of Aristotelian-inspired virtue ethical philosophy. Virtue reasoning is concerned 
with the individual considering the interaction between virtues in any given moral dilemma, 
as much as the end goal of defining an appropriate course of action.  
The problem with many previous attempts to enhance virtue reasoning is that they present 
students with clear-cut dilemmas, pre-identified by the teacher and handed to them on a plate. 
That is not how dilemmas present themselves in real life. The initial challenge facing the 
student – even one which has a decent command of virtue literacy – is to identify the 
situations to which virtue reasoning needs to be applied. We could call this virtue perception, 
defined as ‘[n]oticing situations involving or standing in need of the virtues’ (Jubilee Centre, 
2017: 8). Perceiving virtue in a situation requires the ability to focus attention on ethical 
aspects of particular situations. Virtue perception is closely linked to moral sensitivity (Rest 
et al. 1999) in having the ability to recognise the morally relevant and problematic features of 
a situation. For example, a young person who is unsure if downloading a film from the 
internet is illegal (Curzer, 2014). Virtue reasoning can only take place once the situation has 
been recognised to have a moral dimension to it. Reasoning involves making a decision based 
on virtue and being able to justify the decision through defending a particular judgment and 
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course of action. It must be reflective to allow for the empowerment of the ethical self 
through autonomous decision making. The ability to educate children and young people to 
improve their recognition of morally salient situations and critically engage in virtue 
reasoning that was the focus of the pilot evaluation described presently.  
It is hypothesised that those who are able to perceive a situation that stands in need of the 
virtues coupled with the ability to facilitate virtue reasoning are more likely to act virtuously. 
That is an empirical claim which needs to be tested in practise. However, the empirical claim 
is based on presumed conceptual links between understanding, perception, reasoning and 
motivation, laid out in an Aristotelian theory of virtue.  
 
Intervention to cultivate Virtue Perception and Reasoning  
A naturalist position on virtue ethics allows for the theory to be informed and shaped by 
empirical research (Kristjánsson, 2015). It was with this in mind that a new intervention, 
entitled Making Wiser Choices Online, was developed and piloted. The intervention built on 
similar studies that demonstrate the possibilities of teaching character through and within 
curriculum subjects (Author et al 2016). In this instance the intervention was incorporated 
into the Computer Science programme of study (England), although it was also deemed to be 
relevant to the PSHE and Citizenship Education curriculums.  The intervention, consisting of 
a taught course structured across four one hour computer science lessons, required students to 
be both self-reflective about their own Internet use and its impact on others, as well as to 
imagine new ways of using the Internet.   
At the heart of the Making Wiser Choices Online programme was twelve moral dilemmas, 
developed in conversation with 11-14 year olds, that young people might face in their daily 
lives; these related to concerns such as cyber-bullying, plagiarism, piracy and extremism 
amongst others. Exposure to dilemmas, through the taught programme, was seen to be a way 
in which students could be supported to at first notice and then progress towards resolving 
conflicting moral demands and developing critical reflection. Repeated exposure to dilemmas 
might be seen as a form of advanced habituation where students are gradually brought to 
more critical discernment through the practise of cyber-phronesis with the guidance of an 
outside instructor. The advantage of this approach, and its focus on critical reflection, is that 
moral character education need not be indoctrinating as it is about ‘helping students grasp 
what is ethically important in situations and to act for the right reasons, such that they 
become more autonomous and reflective’ (Jubilee Centre, 2017: 2). Examples of two of the 
dilemmas in the programme are provided below:  
Jack is late with his homework.  He has been asked to write a short essay about the 
virtue of courage that is to be entered into a national competition. He does some 
research online and finds a really good short essay.  Although he knows he can’t copy 
it all he knows he will never be able to write anything better.  His homework is due in 
the next morning and it is already late at night.  What should Jack do?  
Anna is a very loyal to her best friend Rachel.  However, Anna realises that Rachel has 
been sending bullying messages over the Internet to another girl at school.  Anna does 
not really like the other girl, but she also thinks the messages that Rachel has been 
sending are not kind.  One day at school Anna’s teacher asks her if she knows who has 
been sending the nasty messages.  What should Anna do?  
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Alongside other aims, it was hoped that after experiencing the Making Wiser Choices Online 
programme, the pupils would be better equipped to notice when they are in an online 
situation that demands a virtious response (virtue perception), Having achieved this 
perception they would then be able to determine a course of action that took into account 
virtues such as compassion, courage and honesty (virtue reasoning). Consequently, of the two 
concepts this intervention sought to enhance, virtue perception was seen to be prior to virtue 
reasoning. This meant that the evaluation of the intervention was interested in exploring the 
extent to which pupils developed these two concepts both independently and within a 
combined measure.     .  
 
Methods 
The four-lesson intervention, entitled Making Wiser Choices Online, was subjected to a pilot 
evaluation. A pilot is appropriate for the evaluation given; i) well known concerns about 
conducting experiments in education (Thomas, 2016); ii) challenges associated with 
‘measuring’ character (Author et al, 2016); and, iii) the relative immaturity of the 
intervention.  Brown-Urban et. al. (2014) describe four evolutionally stages of  intervention 
evaluation.  The Making Wiser Choices Online programme was deemed to be at the 
‘development stage’ as the programme is still undergoing changes or revisions.  The authors 
recommend a ‘change’ evaluation which:  
‘generally examines a program’s association with change in outcomes for participants in a 
limited and specific context (the focus is not yet necessarily on generalizability to other 
contexts, settings, etc.). Evaluations in this phase are generally correlational studies that use 
either matched or unmatched pre- and post-tests. This phase also generally includes greater 
focus on verifying the reliability and validity of measures’ (Brown-Urban et al, 2014 : 132).  
The pilot evaluation sought evidence that helped to answer the following research questions: 
i) to what extent does the programme enable 11-14 year olds to perceive issues relating to 
moral virtues on the Internet; and, ii) to what extent does the programme enhance the virtue 
reasoning of 11-14 year olds? If the pilot produces statistically significant findings, and the 
measures were deemed to be robust and valid, then it is anticipated the programme would be 
put forward for a larger experimental trial including randomisation.   
Pilot Evaluation  
Three schools in England delivered the Making Wiser Choices Online  intervention between 
February and April 2017 and in total 527 pupils completed both pre- and post-tests. In each 
school, year groups were divided between classes who received the lessons as part of the 
Making Wise Choices Online programme, the ‘intervention’ group (n=262) and those who 
did not participate in the programme and were in the ‘control’ group (n=265).  
The intervention and control groups were from the same school for two reasons: i) within-
school matching increases the likelihood of the control group having a similar profile to that 
of the intervention group and so minimises ‘imbalance across treatment groups’ (Campbell et 
al., 2004: 705); and, ii) it is difficult to recruit schools to provide purely control groups, as 
there is no immediate benefit for them. The measurement instrument sought to test the ability 
of pupils to perceive the moral salience of situations and assess pupils’ ability to undertake 
virtue reasoning. The instrument consisted of a written dilemma related to social media use 
and asked pupils to respond to three questions. The first asked students to explain the 
dilemma and sought to assess pupils’ perception of the moral situation and how virtue 
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knowledge and understanding could be applied within the dilemma. The second asked pupils 
to explain what the protagonist should do in response to the scenario. This question was not 
assessed but was incorporated as an initial step in order to encourage pupils to consider why 
the recommended course of action should be taken. Pupils were asked to provide three 
reasons for why the protagonist should act in a particular way and to identify which reason 
was the most appropriate and this question was intended to assess pupils’ virtue reasoning.  
This focus on attempting to assess virtue reasoning addresses concerns from some quarters 
regarding the believed behaviouristic nature of character education, in which it is suggested 
that character education seeks to promote a limited view of what it is to be a moral person. 
Virtue reasoning is dependent on critical reflection and the development of tools for the 
individual to ascertain the most appropriate course of action in a given situation. 
Consequently, while there is a general assumption at work on what it is to be a moral person, 
the way in which this is demonstrated will be dependent on the specific context in which the 
individual finds him or herself. 
Two versions of the instrument were created so that they could be administered at time 1, 
before the start of the intervention and at time 2, after pupils had participated in the Making 
Wiser Choices Online lessons. The two instruments (referred to as test A and test B) were 
designed to be of equal style, length and intended difficulty, this was assessed through 
considering the Flesch Reading Ease Score, which at 78.8 for Test A and 75.7 for Test B, was 
identified to have a Flesch-Kincaid grade level of 5.2 and 5.7 respectably and so was seen to 
be appropriately targeted to the expected reading level of a child aged between 10 and 11 
years old. The suitability of the test were further established through undertaking a pilot with 
pupils aged between 12 and 13 years in two schools. A sample of  pupils’ responses within 41 
Test A and 40 Test B papers were considered by the researchers and was used to refine the 
mark scheme and also determine prototype answers. In addition, feedback from teaching staff 
on the suitability of the intervention materials was also received and amendments were made 
based on these comments.  
The allocation of Tests A or B to either time 1 or 2 was randomised on a school basis, 
according to whether a class was in the control or intervention group.  Pupils completed the 
instruments independently and in silence. In order to control for pupils’ literacy levels, 
teaching staff were asked to indicate whether their pupils’ literacy level were considered in 
the top, middle or lower third of the class. While this request would necessitate the class 
being split into thirds, analysis indicated that teachers assessed pupils individually as to 
whether they perceived them to have higher, middle or lower levels of literacy which led to 
an uneven distribution of literacy levels. However, arguably, this would reflect a more 
accurate assessment of literacy levels rather than imposing a grouping on a class of students. 
Pupils were also asked to identify their gender to allow for the effects of this variable to be 
considered as part of the analysis (table 1 provides a breakdown of pupils by school, age and 
gender). 
Table 1: Pupils by school, age, and gender 
 
 
Gender School Year 
Female Male Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 
Count Count Count Count Count 
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School 1 69 69 138 0 0 
2 46 65 111 0 0 
3 141 137 0 149 129 
Total 256 271 249 149 129 
 
All teachers were provided with a pack of materials that included instructions regarding the 
delivery of the instrument. Contact was also maintained with the teachers charged with 
implementing the intervention in order to provide clear instructions and clarification as 
required. Nevertheless, despite these safeguards, it was recognised that there may be variation 
in the delivery of the intervention.  
To assess pupils’ responses to the instrument, a scoring rubric was devised and revised after 
piloting. Although the rubric relied on some interpretation by the markers, prototype answers 
drawn from the pilot were included to improve the reliability of the measure. The scale used 
within the marking of each of the two questions within the tests was based on a limited 
number of categories (from a score of zero if the pupil did not attempt a response to the 
question to a score of 4 if the pupil demonstrated an answer that was compatible with the top 
score within the rubric) in order to increase the reliability of the measure. The attribution of 
scores was dependent on how the pupils expressed the identification of virtues, along with 
their reasoning as to why the protagonist should act in a particular way. To further support 
the reliability of the measure, a conservative approach was taken with regards to the marking 
of the test papers which meant that pupils had to express the virtue dimension of the 
dilemma, rather than focussing their responses on the consequences of the protagonist taking 
(or not taking) a particular course of action.  
The pre- and post-tests were marked by the research team, with a quarter (n=263) of the 1054 
tests second marked. Two-way mixed average measures with absolute agreement were used 
to assess inter-rater reliability (IRR) by test A and test B across the two questions and the 
overall total score (table 2). The intra-class correlation varied across both tests for Q1 and 
Q2b and this could perhaps be accounted for by the need for further interpretation of how a 
student has expressed the reasoning behind their stated actions within Q2b. It was felt that the 
measures of reliability in the scoring were robust enough to proceed with marking the tests 
according to the rubric.   
Table 2: Intraclass correlation Coefficients (ICC) 
 N Q1 Q2b Total Score 
Test A  88 0.86 0.72 0.79 
Test B  175 0.96 0.87 0.92 
 
Analysis  
As has already been noted, the rubric was structured to employ a limited scale as this would 
allow for greater consistency in the marking of the test papers, thus increasing the reliability 
of the measure. The requirement for a reliable measure meant that the scale that was used to 
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mark both questions 1 (identifying virtue perception) and 2b (identifying virtue reasoning) 
was restricted to an ordinal variable (with scores ranging from 0-4 for both questions). As has 
already been indicated, the scores for the two questions were then combined in order to create 
a rounded measure of virtue perception and virtue reasoning and this created a continuous 
scale (with scores ranging from 0-8). The justification for combining the scores was that in 
order to be able to give virtuous reasons for undertaking a particular course of action, a 
person must first perceive the situation to stand in the need of a virtuous response.  
The scores were combined in order to respond to theory as discussed above that virtue 
perception is a necessary pre-condition of virtue reasoning. Consequently, it was felt to be an 
interesting area of analysis to consider the combined scores. Those pupils who did not 
attempt either question received an overall score of zero, these data were removed from 
analysis as, due to the tests being administered by the schools, there was no way of knowing 
whether the pupils did not understand what was asked of them, or whether they decided not 
to engage with the test. In addition, pupils who only completed a pre or post-test, or for 
whom the research team did not have data on their gender or teacher-assessed reading and 
writing level, were also removed from the dataset. All statistical analysis was completed 
using SPSS 22.  
Results  
Virtue Perception, Virtue Reasoning and Combined Scores 
Descriptive analysis of the difference between scores within the control and the intervention 
groups demonstrate that the mean score for the intervention group increased across the three 
measures (virtue perception, virtue reasoning and overall total score), as demonstrated 
throughout figures 1, 2 and 3. Across the overall total score for those pupils who received the 
intervention, there was an increase of 7 percentage points (figure 3), which was comprised of 
a 5 percentage point increase for measures of virtue perception (figure 1) and an 8 percentage 
point increase for measures of virtue reasoning (figure 2). At a preliminary level of analysis, 
this suggests the intervention supported the expression of both virtue perception and 
reasoning in that, on average, students achieved a higher score after they had received the 
intervention.  




Figure 2: Measure of virtue reasoning  
 



































In contrast, when considering the results for the control group (figures 1, 2 and 3), it can be 
seen that there was an increase in the scores for the question which identified the perception 
of virtues (a 9 percentage point increase), whereas there is a decrease within the measures of 
virtue reasoning (a 13 percentage point decrease). Overall, there is a 3 percentage point 
decrease in the total overall measure which could be suggested to indicate that increases in 
pupils’ scores are not solely the result of maturation.  
On the basis of the positive descriptive analysis results, a more statistically advanced paired-
sample t-test was conducted to evaluate the impact of the intervention on pupils’ overall 
scores (measuring both virtue perception and virtue reasoning) on the dilemma test. For those 
pupils who received the intervention there was a statistically significant increase in the post-
test score (M = 3.34, SD = 1.38) compared to the pre-test score (M = 3.13, SD = 1.27), t 
(261) = -2.25, p = .03 (two-tailed). In contrast, the control group indicated a decrease 
between the pre (M = 3.26, SD = 1.40) and post-test scores (M = 3.16, SD = 1.30) which was 
not statistically significant, t (264) = 0.95, p = .344 (two-tailed).  
Influence of gender  
On the basis of the positive descriptive analysis results, analysis was furthered through 
undertaking a paired sample t-test and splitting the sample by gender. When the sample was 
split by gender, across the total measure, it can be seen that within both the pre- and post-
scores, females who received the intervention achieved higher scores compared to male 
pupils who also received the intervention (figures 4, 5 and 6).  







































































Figure 6: Total score by gender  
 
It is notable when considering the results of female pupils who received the intervention there 
was a statistically significant increase in the post-test score (M = 3.72, SD = 1.42) compared 
to the pre-test score (M = 3.29, SD = 1.26), t (136) = -3.14, p = .002 (two-tailed). In contrast, 
male pupils demonstrated a small reduction when the pre-tests (M = 2.96, SD = 1.26) are 
compared to the post-tests (M = 2.92, SD = 1.20), t (124) = 0.351, p = .726 (two-tailed), 
however, this was not statistically significant. This result again be suggestive of the greater 
engagement of female pupils with the intervention compared to males or, as previously 
considered, may be indicative of the way in which the evaluation instruments favoured 
female pupils.   
Controlling for literacy levels 
The evaluation of the Making Wiser Choices Online intervention was grounded in the ability 
of individual pupils to perceive how the presented dilemma required the expression of 
virtues, along with providing justification as to why the protagonist should act in the way 
they have suggested. As this was assessed through considering pupils’ written responses to 
the posed questions, it was felt that there could be the opportunity for pupils’ responses to be 
affected by their aptitude for reading and writing in that their response is very much 
dependent on the ability to express their thoughts through writing. As identified, it was felt 
necessary to collect data on pupils’ literacy levels in order to control for any potential effects 
of this on the post-intervention scores. The most appropriate parametric test to undertake this 
analysis was the ANCOVA statistical test, however, on examination, it was identified that the 
dependent variable (overall post-test score) data violated an assumption of the ANCOVA test 
as it had a skewed distribution. Despite this concern, it was decided to follow previous 
literature (Olejnik and Algina, 1984) and to run the ANCOVA as a secondary test, following 
the use of paired sample t-tests. In order to control for pupils’ literacy levels, this variable 
was included as a covariate as well as the pre-test scores in the ANCOVA.  In doing so, we 






















pupils who were part of the intervention after controlling for literacy level and pre-test scores, 
F (1, 523) = 3.68, p=0.05. This followed the finding of Davison et al. (2016) which explored 
the potential conflation between virtue literacy and general reading skills and identified that 
improvement in measures of pupils’ application of virtue concepts in personal, social and 
cultural contexts was most likely to be independent of any improvement in reading level. 
Despite the statistically significant result and the indication that pupils’ literacy levels have 
not been conflated with measures of virtue literacy, there is a need to be cautious when 
analysing this finding due to the violation of the assumptions of ANCOVA. However, such 
results should be read as providing further evidence for the effects of the intervention and 
should allay concerns regarding the effects of pupils’ teacher-assessed literacy levels on the 
post-test scores, and the subsequent analysis of the effectiveness of the Making Wiser 
Choices Online intervention.  
Limitations 
There are several principle limitations to the pilot evaluation; primarily methodological and 
practical in nature. Firstly, the trial involved 527 pupils, while this is a relatively large 
sample, these were purposely sampled from three schools already interested in character 
education. It is not possible to generalise the results, as the participants cannot be deemed to 
be representative of the wider population.  As the intervention and control groups were not 
randomly assignedthere is a possibility of systematic bias through schools potentially 
selecting ‘better’ classes for the intervention group. Also, for practical reasons, both control 
and intervention groups were in the same schools at the same time meaning contamination of 
the control group was possible.  Furthermore, the dilemmas in the pre- and post-test were 
very similar so it is possible that completing the pre-test informed pupils’ answers within the 
post-test. Responding to the dilemmas was very much dependent on the way in which the 
pupil expressed themselves in writing. It may be that  future interventions that consider the 
way in which pupils access the Internet could also consider how other methods which collect 
a broader range of data could be used so as to allow those pupils who may struggle to express 
themselves in writing to convey their thoughts. This is a further area for future research to 
consider. 
The schools were in control of many important features of the pilot, especially the length of 
sessions devoted to the programme, the timings, duration, setting, and conduct of the tests. It 
is recognised that, while efforts were made to ensure that there was consistency to the 
delivery of the intervention, there may be some variation as to how each intervention was 
delivered.   
Finally, the issues of measuring character (Kristjánsson, 2015) and the impact of character 
education interventions (Author, et al., 2016) are well known.  Most notably, these are due to 
the complexity of the construct of character and associated virtues and that measuring how an 
intervention might develop single or multiple constructs presents considerable 
methodological challenges (Duckworth and Yeager, 2015). 
 
Ethical considerations  
Ethical approval was granted for the design of the Making Wiser Choices Online by the 
University of Birmingham Ethics Committee and participants were given the opportunity to 
opt-out of the study and for their pre- and post-tests to not be analysed. Each of the schools 
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involved in the trial confirmed that the control groups would also receive the intervention 
after the completion of the post-test; this was to ensure that no student was disadvantaged 
from their allocation into either the control or intervention groups.   
Discussion 
The results of the trial are encouraging for those interested in the age-old question can 
character and, more specifically, components of virtues be taught?  Although the results are a 
long way from providing an answer to the question; they do shed some important light on 
how two components of virtue (perception and reasoning) might be educated through targeted 
interventions. Whilst there has been significant, mainly philosophical, developments in 
understandings about the conceptual nature of the components of character and virtue (see, 
for example, Rest et al, 1997; Jubilee Centre, 2017), empirical evidence about how these 
concepts might be cultivated in children and young people through education has been more 
scarce.  The present results, add some new evidence, about how virtue perception and 
reasoning might be taught to 11-14 year olds in the UK.The picture as to how virtues can be 
cultivated becomes slightly clearer if the current findings are read in combination with other 
studies, for example, those showing how virtue knowledge and understanding can be 
developed (Arthur et al; 2015) and how virtue emotion (Ornaghi, Brockmeier, & Grazzani, 
2014) might be taught. If we consider virtues, as Curzer (2016) suggests, to be made up of 
many parts, it is important to consider these separate components in turn in order to address 
the much bigger concern about appropriate strategies for the education of virtue.  
Given that the study was a evaluation of an intervention in its developmental stage, 
alternative explanations for the results cannot be ruled out.  Firstly, the pre- and post- tests (as 
well as the programme itself) were likely subject to ‘demand characteristics’ (Orne et al., 
2000) in that the participants tried to work out the aim of the study and answer in ways to 
either support those aims or undermine them. A particular issue with studies on character is a 
social desirability effect often associated with research methods that rely on self report, where 
participants strive to give answers that are deemed to be ‘acceptable’. Secondly, given that 
the intervention was an isolated curriculum intervention it is not possible to determine if the 
participants carry any enhancement in their virtue perception and reasoning into their wider 
online lives.  To determine this would most likely demand a more substantial longitudinal, 
study.     
Further, there remains the significant problem, much as there has been with previous moral 
development models (Rest et al. 1999), of gaining evidence as to how the components relate 
to each other as well as, most importantly, how they contribute to the overall goal of virtue 
practice and action.  Narvaez (2002), who was also involved with the development of the 
four-component model, has previously challenged assumptions that children build moral 
literacy from reading or hearing moral stories. However, if we understand that character 
requires autonomous and critical reflection on the part of individuals; and to do this requires 
the ability to both be able to notice an issue that stands in need of virtues, and to also justify a 
subsequent course of action that draws on the virtues, then it is possible to see how the 
enhancement of virtue perception and reasoning might help address the infamous ‘knowing 
and doing’ gap.      
 
Alongside the results, significance comes from the novel use of the methodology itself.  
Given that concerns about the measurement of character are well-known (Kristjánsson, 
2015), advancements in this area are important.  Although trials into character education 
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interventions are becoming increasing commonplace (see, for example Education 
Endowment Foundation, n.d.); challenges to validity are as equally common (see for 
example, Arthur et al., 2014).  In using dilemmas to investigate virtue reasoning, the present 
research has utilised an established methodology, (Thoma, 2014; Author el al, Morris and 
Ryan, 2016) which has been prevalent since the work of Kohlberg (1981).   Dilemmas have 
often been used in research that considers how particular populations, for example: teachers 
(Arthur et al., 2015), children and young people (Walker, Curren and Jones,  2016), and 
various professions (Bebeau and Thoma, 2013), respond to moral and ethical dilemmas.  The 
present research utilised ethical dilemmas, found online, as the basis of a before and after test 
to evaluate a character education intervention. The significant results suggests that such an 
approach is a valid and useful instrument and helps, somewhat, to counter the ‘serious 
challenges’ (Duckworth and Yeager, 2015: 1) of measuring character.  However, one of the 
main critiques of dilemmas remains, in  that they show what a person might theoretically do – 
but not necessary how they would respond in a ‘real life’ situation.. 
It was important within the trial to control for literacy levels (Davison et al, 2016). The 
research team were keen to address the possible conflation of general and virtue-specific 
literacy.  The ANCOVA results suggest that literacy levels were not a factor in the results, 
however, given the complexity of running trials of this nature, it cannot be discounted that 
higher test scores may in fact be an artefact of the way in which the intervention was 
evaluated, and the emphasis placed on pupils’ ability to express their thoughts in writing. 
This may also account for the female participants’ higher scores. Research has demonstrated 
that, at age 11, a higher proportion of male students have reading attainment levels lower than 
expected compared to female students (Moss and Washbrook, 2016). The extent to which the 
evaluation, and potentially also the intervention, could have favoured female pupils requires 
further exploration. As also seen in the Character Education in UK Schools study (Arthur et 
al., 2015) female pupils also scored higher in the Intermediate Concept Measure for 
Adolescents (Ad-ICM) when compared to male pupils. Potential explanations as to why this 
may be the case are considered by Walker et al. (2017) and it is particularly noted that “A 
degree of social-desirability bias should not be ruled out” (p. 603) in that it may be the case 
that female pupils, through the process of assessing their virtue perception and virtue 
reasoning, may be more likely to identify choices which were coherent to their perceptions of 
adults’ preferences. Nevertheless, Walker et al. (2017) indicate that a female pupil whose 
response is affected by social desirability bias would still be required to demonstrate 
‘appropriate moral judgement’ (p. 603). This is suggestive of the need to explore further the 
foundations on which the presumed greater expression of social desirability from females 
within this trial is built. Such an appeal for additional research is further complicated by the 
fact that the differences in scores between male and female pupils could be potentially 
attributed to greater engagement with the intervention, or may be a result of the way in which 
this engagement has been measured through the pre- and post-tests.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has been based on the argument that human qualities and virtues, such as 
compassion, courage and integrity, are generally admired.  It has also been based on the 
argument that, in some form, education has always sought to cultivate these virtues in 
children and young people – although not always explicitly. More explicit attempts might be 
called character education, an approach that has been promoted most recently by individuals 
and organisations from across the political spectrum.  Arguments about what form this 
character education should take have been presented and the paper has sought to address this 
issue through an in-depth focus on a single intervention.      
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Evidence from the pilot evaluation of the Making Wiser Choices Obline  programme with 
(527) 11-14 year olds is that it might be possible to teach virtue perception and reasoning  
through deliberate educational efforts. Further, it would appear that males and females may 
respond differently to either  the intervention, or the way in which it is evaluated. This 
finding appears to mirror prior literature which has considered the differences in male and 
female pupils responses to moral dilemmas and is an area which is ripe for further study. 
Most encouraging, despite the limitations of the pilot, was that advancements were seen over 
the duration of a relatively short programme, targeted at a particular age group.  Deliberate 
efforts that span a child and young person’s education will likely have more substantial 
effects.  These findings are reported tentatively given the relative immaturity of the 
intervention and the limitations associated with evaluating character education interventions 
which might suggest alternative reasons for the results.  
Whilst the paper adds to the evidence in support of claims that two important elements of 
virtue, perception and reasoning, might be cultivated through deliberate educational efforts; it 
leaves many questions still to be answered.  Most notably is how these aforementioned pillars 
of virtue can be bridged together and contribute to an individual actually carrying out 
virtuous actions as a matter of course.   The paper concludes with the assertion, that if these 
gaps are to be ameliorated, then philosophers, psychologists and educationalists with an 
interest in the area should work together on this challenge.  
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